An Article Paper : Securing a Network Society

Written by Shiksha Press

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 “Securing a Network Society”
By Ms.Kulvinder Kaur(Assistant Professor In Computer Science)

Introduction: The advent of the Information Age, coupled with the resurgence of terrorism on the international landscape brings forth questions on the nature of security and the mechanisms for confronting new asymmetric threats. While globalization and advances in computer technology have led to increased opportunities in numerous fields, they have also resulted in new dangers. In the global post-9/11 environment, new transnational threats are emerging. This chapter examines the role of information technology in a period some have identified as the “Age of Terrorism.” 

First, cyber terrorism becomes an increasing concern as society’s dependence on information technology intensifies. However, cyber terrorism can and must be distinguished from both legal and illegal forms of computer-driven activism and dissent, as this distinction is necessary for the maintenance of civil liberties. 

Second, prospects for addressing the cyber terrorist and global terrorist threat include numerous forms of military and political cooperation, from the regional and national to the international. 

Third, a legal approach illustrates concerns over the balance between rights and security and the restrictions on each when contemplating the role of information technology. This chapter explores the many faces of terrorism and security in the Information Age, addressing questions on the nature of the threat, prospects for defence, and the protection of civil rights. Advances in computer technology have remapped the world, to the point that distances from Ottawa to Toronto and from New York to London are virtually identical. While globalization and the Information Age have led to increased opportunities in numerous fields, they have also resulted in new dangers. In the post-9/11 international environment, new transnational threats to Canada are emerging. 

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The coinciding of amplified adoption and implementation of computer and information technologies with the re-emergence of terrorism on a transnational scale brings forth several questions. What contribution will technological innovations make to terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts?

What are the legal justifications for and social consequences of increased technological interention into domestic and foreign societies? It makes two arguments:-

1 Information and communications technologies enable new modes of terrorism, the threat of which intensifies as society becomes increasingly dependent upon computer networks. Technology-driven terrorism is discrete from virtual forms of activism or dissent, and such a distinction is necessary for the preservation of civil liberties.

2. Information and communication technologies also make possible new modes of counter-terrorism. Central to this argument are questions regarding what techniques have been facilitated through more recent technological innovations. While transnational approaches to addressing terrorism are particularly significant in a network society, can technology-driven methods of intervention and intelligence-gathering be less intrusive than more traditional techniques in the violation of privacy rights? In light of the recent debates over the balancing of rights and security, this chapter argues that a particular configuration of legal and technological mechanisms may enable not only the capacity to maintain security, but also the potential for preserving the essence of the right to privacy.

While current forms of technology-driven surveillance are not legally justified in the Canadian context, technological and legal remedies can bring them into the boundaries of Canadian law. In exploring these hypotheses, this chapter is presented in four parts:

  1. An examination of various forms of politically-driven technological action;
  2. A scalar comparison of possibilities for addressing terrorism in the Information Age;
  3. A description of the current classifications of technology-driven surveillance and intelligence-gathering.
  4. An analysis of the legal and social implications of technological intervention and intrusion during an Age of Terrorism.


In the 1983 movie War Games, Matthew Broderick’s character breached the Pentagon computer system and almost started World War III. Since, then, much of the Western world has been both captivated and mystified by the idea of computer conflict, hacking and, more recently, cyber terrorism.

The concept of cyber terrorism is rooted in two fields of study: information technology and asymmetric conflict. First, the modern technological revolution, originating in the 1980s, has led authors such as Alvin and Heidi Toffler to argue that information technologies are transforming industrial societies into information-based societies.

Occurring primarily in developed, industrialized regions, there exists an increasing reliance upon complex networks and modern technologies for the proper functioning of society. This post-industrial period has been coined the “Information Age”. Manuel Cast ells argues that the most recent period of the Information Age is one dominated by networks. As a new socio-political and economic configuration, “network society” consists of a “space of flows” where various transactions and encounters take place. Second, asymmetric threats, specifically in the form of terrorism, have existed since, the dawn of warfare.

Defined by the U.S., Joint Chiefs of staff as attempts to circumvent or undermine a superior military power’s strengths while exploiting its weaknesses, using methods that differ from the superior military power’s expected mode of operations, the recent escalation in asymmetric threats is commonly considered a result of the demonstration of U.S., military might in the first Gulf War.

Not limited solely to cyber terrorism, those seeking to challenge U.S., power have recognized that conflict on the traditional battlefield using conventional military weaponry is no longer feasible. As such, the threat of cyber terrorism comes from both states and non-state actors and, though negative, is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the transition to an information-based society.


Attempts to define cyber terrorism suffer from the same dilemmas as definitions of terrorism. Generally, cyber terrorism is a result of the Convergence of technology and terrorism, and consists of two mutually dependent elements. First, it refers to attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and the information stored within them, for the purpose of intimidating or influencing a government or society to further political or social objectives. Second, the attack results in violence against persons or property, or at least causes enough harm to generate fear.

The definition is a reinterpretation of mainstream characterizations of terrorism infused with technological terminology. While it should be noted that terrorism is still somewhat of a contested term, section 83.01 of the Anti-Terrorism Act provides an in-depth classification within the Canadian context. A cyber terrorist differs from a terrorist who uses technology. Cyber terrorism consists of an attack on a technological factor using another technological factor.

This is distinct from a terrorist utilizing technology to commit a traditional act of terrorism, and is also distinct from a terrorist using non-technological means to commit an act of terrorism against a network of computer system. For example, an act of cyber terrorism occurs when an individual or organization uses a computer network to overload and destroy a national power-management system. Distinctions must also be

Made between cyber terrorism and activism, the latter being a term coined by scholars to describe the marriage of hacking with political Activism.  While politically motivated, activism differs from cyber terrorism in that the former seeks to protest and disrupt, not to kill, physically injure, or terrify. As such, serious attacks against critical infrastructure, depending on their impact, could be acts of terrorism; whereas attacks that disrupt non-essential services would most likely not. This distinction between cyber terrorism and cyber dissent is of significance as it addresses, to a limited extent specifically in the field of computer technology.


As a result of globalization, computerization and the emergence of a network society, numerous authors have argued that cyber terrorism is becoming increasingly attractive to terrorists for several reasons. First, cyber terrorism is generally perceived to be more cost-effective than traditional terrorist methods. Typical computers and phone or broadband internet connections are generally much cheaper and easier to acquire than traditional types of weaponry, such as explosives and military-grade vehicles.

Cyber terrorist attacks also do not result in the attacker’s death, as is the case with suicide bombers, and as is potentially the case in traditional acts of terrorism. Second, cyber terrorism possesses a certain amount of anonymity not found in more traditional forms of terrorism.  As such, it has become increasingly difficult for security agencies to determine the real identities of the terrorists.

This complex obstacle is further enhanced by the lack of customs, borders or checkpoints within cyber space. While the fact remains that all Internet traffic passes through at least one of thirteen central servers that act as the foundation of the World Wide Web, the sheer amount of information transferred creates considerable challenges for data analysis and effective intelligence collection. Third, the quantity and quality of targets increases as society moves towards further dependence on information technologies.

The multiplicity of potential targets is already enormous, ranging from government military systems to civilian economic and scientific networks. Fourth, cyber terrorism removes or reduces the requirement for geographical proximity to the target. This virtually eliminates the traditional requirements for physical and psychological training to avoid capture, and risk of mortality. The ability to conduct cyber terrorism remotely is a key factor in the transnational nature of committing terrorist acts and in recruiting new members. Fifth, cyber terrorism can potentially have a direct affect on a larger number of people than traditional terrorist methods, thereby generating widespread effects and increasing awareness of particular causes.

While a suicide bomber may destroy a building, killing the tens or hundreds of individuals inside, a cyber terrorist attack on a waste-management or energy system has the potential to kill or injure thousands, if not millions of people.


It should be emphasized that no single cyber terrorist attack has been recorded – that is, categorized as such. This begs the question of whether cyber terrorism is a real threat. Current discussions revolve around military systems, intelligence networks, government systems and critical infrastructure. First, suggestions have been put forth that cyber terrorists could compromise military systems, such as a nuclear missile launch facility, and either launch a missile or disable the entire system.

Currently, the cyber terrorism threat of this type is non-existent. Government statements indicate that major military systems, such as the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Pentagon, and nuclear launch facilities, are “air-gapped”. That is, they are not physically connected to external networks such as the Internet. The implied conclusion is that computer network attacks would be ineffective against these types of military networks.

However, during a U.S., military exercise conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), attackers using tools available on the Internet were able to gain access to several key U.S., systems. While the details remain classified, the report on the exercise concluded that military infrastructure could be disrupted and troop deployments could be hindered.

Most security and intelligence systems are also protected in the same way as military infrastructure. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) all utilize stand-alone networks. More general government systems, in both the United States and in Canada, are further protected by the development of proprietary systems, unique to each branch of government. While this has often led to difficulties in cooperation between agencies, it has also provided protection in that only a select few individuals understand the systems well enough to violate them. In an ironic twist, inefficiency breeds security.

While government systems may be connected to external networks, such as the Internet, the proprietary nature of current computer applications in combination with screening processes for new employees ensures a relatively high level of security from the cyber terrorist threat. Critical infrastructure consists of less-protected secondary targets, such as power grids, oil pipelines, water-treatment and waste-management systems. Particularly in the United States, most of these systems are privatized and are not currently as of much a concern as military or government systems. As such, critical infrastructure systems are less secure than military, intelligence or government systems.

Concerns over the susceptibility of U.S., critical infrastructure are significant to Canadians due to the numerous connections between Canadian and U.S., systems. Additionally, 85 per cent of Canada’s critical infrastructure is owned by stake holders other than the federal government. However, while critical infrastructure is possibly more vulnerable to cyber terrorism, it is still quite secure.

These systems are under constant threat from natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods or tornados, and company employees are trained to act in emergency scenarios. Nonetheless, as a consequence of openness to external networks and lower security thresholds, a cyber terrorist threat to critical infrastructure does exist. Cyber attacks differ from traditional emergencies and natural disasters in that they can be directed and concentrated at specific weak points in a computer network.

Attackers were also able to gain access to power grid and emergency systems, resulting in service disruptions. While this potential problem may be alleviated through comprehensive employee screening processes, such security measures may be decreasingly feasible as a result of deregulation. Second, deregulation potentially leads to an increased risk of cyber terrorism. An amplified focus on profitability has forced utility companies and other critical infrastructure businesses to move increasing proportions of their operations to the Internet in search of greater efficiency and lower costs.

This may result in further risk and exposure to cyber terrorist threats. Growing cross-border interdependency will play an increasingly important role in the vulnerability of vital networks.

For example, strong links between Canadian and U.S., critical infrastructure were demonstrated during the 2003 Canada-U.S., blackout, in which a transformer station in Cleveland malfunctioned, causing power outages affecting 40 million people in Canada and the north-western United States. In sum, despite current concerns over the vulnerabilities of military, security and intelligence, government and critical infrastructure systems, the nature of these systems currently suggests that such concerns are generally unfounded, though a potential threat is present. 


The relatively insignificant threat of a cyber terrorist attack brings forth the question of why the threat is exaggerated. The reasons behind this are four-fold. First, as Dorothy E. Denning, a professor of computer science speaking before the U.S., House Armed Services Committee, has observed, “cyber terrorism and cyber attacks are sexy right now. It’s novel, original, it captures people’s imagination”. As such, the concept of cyber terrorism has symbolic power that creates compelling and frightening scenarios, influencing perceptions and contributing to the remaining three reasons below.

In addition to the symbolic impact of cyber terrorism, the mass media frequently fail to distinguish between activism and cyber terrorism, often exaggerating the threat of the latter. The two are not analogous. Additionally, misunderstandings between computer crime and cyber terrorism have also surfaced. Ambiguity about the very meaning of “cyber terrorism” has confused the public and given rise to many misrepresentations. Third, there is a general fear of the unknown.

Despite the advent of Third Wave society, many people, including most lawmakers and government officials, still do not fully understand and therefore tend to fear both computer technology and terrorism. As a result, psychological distress and the desire for self-preservation increase the likelihood of accepting unnecessary measures to combat an exaggerated threat. Fourth, some groups are eager to exploit this ignorance. National security officials are inclined to take measures to increase their presence and influence in government, while the computer technology industry, still recovering from the collapse of the high-tech bubble, seeks to regain its economic foothold.

Any response to a cyber terrorist threat requires enhanced technology, training and maintenance. Some politicians have “played the role of prophets of doom”, purposely stoking fears of cyber terrorism, whether out of genuine conviction or from a desire to create public anxiety in order to advance a political agenda. While the potential threat of cyber terrorism is currently exaggerated, many analysts predict an increase in the actual threat. Looking at the various trends in military transformation, technological innovation and terrorist sophistication, the threat of cyber terrorism and computer-based attacks in expected to increase in the future for three principal reasons:-

  1. First, the next generation of terrorists is now growing up in an increasingly digital world, alongside or integrated into post-industrial society, and will therefore be progressively more proficient in the use of information and computer technologies. An example of recent activity, though not classified as cyber terrorism, is Titan Rain, the name given to a series of attacks against the U.S., since, 2003, in which the networks at Lockheed martin and NASA were infiltrated. 
  2. Second, cyber terrorism may also become more attractive as the real and virtual worlds become more closely coupled. Increasing demands for efficiency and interoperability in critical infrastructure, government systems and potentially intelligence systems will ultimately result in elevated degrees of exposure to outside networks, and therefore cyber terrorist attacks. For example, the push by the U.S., military towards the network-centric warfare doctrine has resulted in new attempts at military transformation and integration. The Global Information Grid, which seeks to encompass the end-to- end set of information capabilities, is a primary example. During a no-notice exercise performed by the U.S., Department of Defense, operators at a power management station were fooled by manipulated SCADA data into taking actions that would have damaged the system. 
  3. Third, success in the “war on terror” on the traditional battlefield may result in terrorists turning increasingly towards unconventional weapons such as cyber terrorism. The cost-effectiveness (in both human and economic terms), anonymity, abundance of critical targets and geographical freedom provide several incentives for terrorists to experiment with this new method. As such, while the current conjecture regarding the cyber terrorist threat is exaggerated, the expected increase in cyber terrorist activity demands that legal and technological remedies be explore.


Indicating that no acts of cyber terrorism have occurred, does not necessarily imply that the potential cyber terrorist threat should not be addressed. Irwin Cutler argues that the nature of security legislation, particularly in regards to terrorism, is preventative rather than reactive– that it is necessary to stop acts of terrorism, including cyber terrorism, before they occur. While the extent and scope of preventative approaches should be questioned, the following portion of this chapter examines current and potential legal and political mechanisms at various scales for combating the threat of cyber terrorism.


Canadian domestic legal mechanisms are insufficient for addressing terrorism, and especially cyber terrorism. The transnational nature of the threat, severely limits the utility of federal or sub-federal law. Of particular interest here is the lack of geographic restrictions on acts of cyber terrorism. Not only can cyber terrorism occur from outside the territorial boundaries of the state, but acts can originate from numerous foreign states simultaneously.

Therefore, domestic mechanisms such as the U.S., terrorism watch lists are either inadequate or inefficient. The dilemma rests on the rise of the network society and increasing dependence on information and computer technologies for the production of everyday life.  While Canadian security legislation, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), addresses acts of terrorism against Canadian citizens abroad, it cannot take legal action against cyber terrorism without the consent of the foreign government from which the cyber terrorist act originated.

National sovereignty remains enforced and universal jurisdiction is currently non-existent. As such, existing domestic legal mechanisms are insufficient.


Bilateral agreements may not be feasible due to the mobility and deplorability of cyber terrorism, as well as bureaucratic impracticability.

1. Cost-effectiveness, the global extension of computer technologies and lack of geographic restrictions suggests that cyber terrorist attacks can originate in almost any country.

2. With over 200 countries enjoying access to the Internet and  related communications technologies, bilateral agreements are bureaucratically unfeasible. As such, governments must approach the issue at the international scale. Whereas Canada’s Securing an Open Society is a national strategy, securing a network society requires approaching the issue transnational

International Agreements 1 (Combating Terrorism):-

 Combating Terrorism Common international platforms are required to address the terrorist threat, and there are two components of international agreements worth considering: international law and policy harmonization. International law originating within international, multilateral institutions can most successfully address cyber terrorism. While there has been disagreement over whether a universal definition of terrorism can be ascertained, the United Nations has successfully issued international legislation concerning weapons of terrorism, and regarding supporters of terrorism. Multilateral institutions are particularly crucial because of the variegated definitions of terrorism and the legitimacy that comes from agreements among several states in an open and transparent forum. The legislating of any international law on cyber terrorism should consider three factors:-

1. A definition of what constitutes a cyber terrorist act should be established. Distinctions can and should be made between acts of cyber terrorism and acts of cyber dissent or activism. 

2 A designation of what actions are required for a legal response should be determined. This includes whether a target should be notified before retribution for a cyber terrorist act is executed, and under what circumstances. 

  1. The agreement should promote transnational cooperation. National interests should be compromised to the minimal extent possible when addressing the attribution of cyber terrorist attacks and subsequent potential retribution. Policy harmonization is a consequence of common international platforms. International requirements for the legislating of domestic policies on cyber terrorism increase domestic and international security and transnational cooperation. An instructive example, addressed specifically at terrorism, is UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

A second example is the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber -Crime. Signed by Canada in 2001, this treaty is “the first-ever international treaty to address criminal law and procedural aspects of various types of criminal behavior directed against computer systems, networks or data and other types of similar misuse”. While not addressed specifically at cyber terrorism, the cyber crime treaty requires states to criminalize certain forms of abuse of computer systems and certain crimes when they are committed using computer systems. The treaty also supports international cooperation to detect, investigate and prosecute these criminal offences, as well as to collect electronic evidence of any criminal offence.

However, the Convention on Cyber-Crime does not include key elements of the terrorism definition. Specifically, it does not refer to political, ideological or religious motivations or objectives.

Therefore, current international legal mechanisms are insufficient in addressing the cyber terrorist threat and new agreements must be established. The secondary danger is the collection of data by governments from commercial actors. This activity lacks transparency and accomplishes an “end-run around the checks otherwise applicable when government seeks personal information”. Information-gathering requires governmental regulation, oversight and transparency, a feature not common in the commercial harvesting of personal data.

 International Agreements 2 (Addressing the Case Of Terrorism):-


The ECHELON surveillance system began its current phase of development in 1971 as a component of the post-WWII UK/USA intelligence cooperation and information-sharing alliance. Using electronic- intercept stations and space satellites, the purpose of ECHELON is generally signals intelligence (SIGINT), and specifically communications intelligence (COMINT).

The transnational surveillance system additionally has the capability to acquire other forms of intelligence and information. ECHELON captures military, political and diplomatic communications traffic from across the globe, though recent events have indicated that the system is also being used for economic purposes.

ECHELON is not designed to eavesdrop on specific individuals. Instead, the surveillance system works on the basis of automated analysis. Messages and conversations are filtered though a computer system called Dictionary which detects keywords and phrases– a method of processing information is known as “data-mining.” Five countries currently participate in the ECHELON system, providing global coverage through intercept ground stations and space-based satellites. 


Addressing matters of privacy and surveillance inevitably results in debates concerning oversight and the balancing of rights and security. The following portion of this stage discusses these issues in five parts:

1. The proportionality test.

2. The existence of a right to privacy in the Canadian context.

3. The nature of automated surveillance and an analytical section on “veil of ignorance”.

4. The balancing act between the right to privacy and security. 

5. A proposal to remedy the problem of oversight.


Canadian case law has identified three different types of privacy:

1. Personal;

2. Territorial; and

3. Informational.

Personal privacy includes the protection of bodily integrity, as indicated in R. v. Golden and in R. v. Still man. Territorial privacy includes the protection of privacy in the home, being the place where the most intimate and private activities are likely to take place. As per Cory J. in R. v. Silviers,  “[t]here is no place on earth where persons can have a greater expectation of privacy than within their ‘dwelling-house’”.

Other forms of territorial privacy include: in the perimeter space around the home, in commercial space, in private cars, in a school, and in prison. Territorial privacy is used as an analytical tool for evaluating the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy. Much more controversial than personal privacy and territorial privacy is informational privacy, defined as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”. The existence and lawfulness of a right to a reasonable expectation of informational privacy has been indicated in R. v. S.A.B. and in R. v. Law.

The “reasonable” nature of the expectation of privacy is derived from two factors:

1. The Oakes test; 

2. The “Totality of the circumstances” test.

First, the expectation of privacy can be violated if the objective is reasonable and demonstrably justified. The Oakes test demands that two requirements be met before the violation of a right or freedom can occur: sufficient importance of the objective, and proportionality between the limiting measure and the objective.

Second the reasonable expectation of privacy is subject to the “totality of the circumstances” test set out by Cory J. in R. v. Edwards. Briefly, this test asks two questions: Did the respondent have a reasonable expectation of privacy? And if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in this case, was it violated by police conduct? These questions must be specifically tailored, depending on facts of the case. Thus the expectation of privacy can “reasonably” be violated:-

• If the objective and means of the violation is in accordance with s.1 of the Charter.

• If there is either no reasonable expectation of privacy, or if a reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by the lawful conduct of law enforcement. Nonetheless, the development of case law suggests that Canada is either progressing towards or already situated at a position in which the right to privacy in constitutionally protected, but subject to the context of the crisis or emergency at hand.


The nature of ECHELON and other electronic surveillance systems is such that information is automatically filtered by computer systems. ECHELON is not designed to eavesdrop on specific individuals. Instead, the surveillance system works on the basis of automated analysis. Messages and conversations are filtered though a computer system called Dictionary which detects keywords and phrases. This structure is analogous to John Rawls’ conception of a “veil of ignorance.” While those developing the surveillance system are not completely disinterested, automated analysis removes personal biases that pervade other forms of intelligence gathering.

Automated systems, while not immune from subjectivity due to their construction by humans, are more capable of eliminating the discrimination often witnessed in human intelligence (HUMINT) or in law enforcement. The use of computer-based keyword and phrase analysis results in amplified complexities and increased difficulties in manipulating the system. Currently, electronic surveillance systems are the most objective components of the intelligence apparatus.

However, the analysis of electronically-gathered information is the realm in which increased subjectivity and bias come into play. As such the issue concerns how the data is analyzed rather than how information is collected.


Taking into consideration the threat of cyber terrorism, the preventative nature of law, the reasonable expectation of privacy and the automated nature of transnational surveillance, the “Oakes test” can be employed in analyzing the balance between the privacy and security. When situating the risk in relation to national security, a tangible threat of cyber terrorism is non-existent, yet a potential threat remains.

In the post-9/11 security environment, increasingly driven by information technology, preventative measures are necessary for the maintenance of security. The potential number of casualties resulting from a cyber terrorist attack on critical infrastructure, or government systems is sufficient to warrant a limitation on the right to privacy. Therefore the first requirement of the “Oakes test” is satisfied.

In the second component of the “Oakes test,” the rational connection requirement is satisfied due to the transnational nature of cyber terrorism. Transnational surveillance is a prerequisite for any success derived from international agreements. However the issue becomes more problematic when considering the final two requirements: –

Proportionality between  the effects of the violation and the objective; and the minimal impairment of rights. This complexity is the result of the secretive nature of the ECHELON system. To what extent does ECHELON eavesdrop on the global communication networks? Who has ultimate control over the intelligence acquired? What restrictions exist on access to and operationalisation of the intelligence collected? These questions are of significant importance in analyzing the balance between rights and security.

Without a deeper understanding on the functioning of the ECHELON surveillance system, the application of the “Oakes test” cannot be fully realized. However, a consideration of the automated nature of analysis in combination with an appreciation of the potential threat posed by terrorism and cyber terrorism may be sufficient to establish that a balance between rights and security in the utilization of ECHELON can be achieved.


The coinciding of the rise of the network society in the Information Age with the re-emergence of asymmetric threats in the Age of Terrorism signals the need for new approaches to old, established ideas. While information and communications technologies enable new modes of terrorism, they also provide avenues for defense.

The preservation of civil liberties is predicated on the distinction between technology- driven terrorism and virtual forms of activism and dissent. By providing greater anonymity, the protection of the right to privacy may also be increasingly possible as society becomes more integrated with information and computer technologies.

The political and legal approaches to addressing terrorism in a network society are necessarily transnational. However, legal questions on the transparency of surveillance systems or, alternatively, oversight mechanisms for regulating electronic modes of intelligence-gathering, must be answered before such systems can be considered compatible with Canadian law.

Preventing acts of terrorism or cyber terrorism in a network society requires a sustained, multi-scalar effort by governments and security agencies – not only to maintain the safety of citizens, but also to ensure that rights and freedoms are not unnecessarily trampled upon.


Ms. Kulvinder Kaur  (Assistant Professor In Computer Science) ,
Bhai Asa Singh Girls College , Goniana  Mandi, (Bathinda),Punjab
Affiliated To Punjabi University ,(Patiala).

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